Tripartite evolutionary game of food safety regulation during storage and transportation

Abstract

Food safety requires the cooperation of government, food consignors and food carriers during storage and transportation, which lacks attention in the existing literature. To analyze the dynamic evolution and influence factors of strategies made by stakeholders in food safety regulation, evolutionary game theory was introduced in this study. A tripartite evolutionary game model involving government, food consignors and food carriers during storage and transportation was constructed using Matlab for analysis and verification. Results show that: (1) Food consignors and carriers can be encouraged to input safety factors during storage and transportation and carry out compliant operation if the government increases the fines on enterprises for non-compliant operation, thus elevating the probability of successful regulation. (2) Food consignors can gain certain benefits and enhance corporate reputation through safety input during storage and transportation, which will encourage them to manage their investments strategically. Moreover, the more severe the issues related to food safety during storage and transportation are, the greater the negative impact on the enterprise will be, and this can prompt food consignors to place more emphasis on food safety. (3) If the probability of food consignors exposing food carriers for non-compliant operation increases, the market share loss brought to the carriers due to non-compliant operation and the negative impact arising from this will be higher, and food carriers will pay more attention to the food safety problem. This study enriches the theoretical research on food safety regulation during storage and transportation and provides guiding insights for improving food safety regulation.